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Abstract—Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) have 
attracted significant attention, specifically due to successful 
deployment of ultra-reliable low-latency communications with 
Fifth Generation (5G) wireless networks. Due to the safety-
critical nature of CAV, reliability is one of the well-investigated 
areas of research. Security of in-vehicle communications is 
mandatory to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, existing 
research so far focused on in-vehicle isolation or resilience 
independently. This short paper presents the elements of an 
integrated in-vehicle isolation and resilience framework to 
attain a higher degree of reliability for CAV systems. The 
proposed framework architecture leverages benefits of Trusted 
Execution Environments to mitigate several classes of threats. 
The framework implementation is also mapped to the 
AUTOSAR open automotive standard. 
Keywords - Isolation; Resilience; ECU; Monitoring; Trusted 
Execution Environment; AUTOSAR; Certification.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite considerable progress in the last decade, the 
development of fully self-driving vehicles is still largely 
under research and experimentation. In such safety-critical 
systems, the resilience of in-vehicle and inter-vehicle 
communication is a key element to ensure the security of the 
vehicle. While in-vehicle relates to on-board communication 
between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) acting based on 
inputs from different sensors, inter-vehicular 
communications enable data exchange with the external 
environment including other vehicles, broadband clouds and 
roadside-infrastructures [1]. 
In this system of systems model, the diversity, autonomy 
and connectivity of vehicles mean vulnerabilities at the level 
of the vehicle affect the larger environment [2]. While both 
types of communication enable safety-critical decision-
making, in-vehicle communication requires special 
attention. The disparity of coding practices among the 
diversity of specialised vendors in different functionalities 
(e.g., infotainment, braking and steering assistance), and the 
trust model induced by the high degree of connectivity and 
unrestricted interactions between vehicle components to 
enable comfort features (e.g., adjusting the sound volume 
according to the velocity) widen the attack surface [1].  
Internal security barriers to detect and react to an 
intrusion are therefore needed to limit the impact of a 
compromise and to mitigate its propagation to different 
subsystems within a vehicle [1]. Moreover, the adoption of 
new technologies in the automotive domain is opening new 
safety and security challenges. For example, the advent of 
new generations of ECUs that are virtualized as lightweight 
execution environments (e.g., virtual machines, containers) 
on different types of virtualization platforms, (e.g., OKL4 
Microvisor, Proteus Hypervisor, ETAS STA-HVR [3]) may 
face system-level isolation challenges such as side-channels. 
This short paper introduces our approach to detect and 
limit the impact of intrusions for in-vehicle networks that 
can compromise the safety of autonomous vehicles. This 
will be a step towards enhancing the robustness of in-
vehicle communications through the isolation of ECUs, the 
detection of and recovery from intrusions. Focusing on 
spoofing, replay, and side-channel attacks, we present 
principles of a framework for in-vehicle isolation and 
resilience and discuss technical considerations for its 
implementation according to the AUTomotive Open System 
ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) open standard. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section II presents 
related work. Section III introduces our framework and 
Section IV discusses considerations to adhere to the 
AUTOSAR standard. We conclude our paper in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK  
A significant body of work focuses on improving 
resilience of connected autonomous vehicles. Solutions 
against threats can be categorised as i) Proactive Defence, 
ii) Active Defence and iii) Passive Defence [4]-[8]. We give 
next a brief overview of each family of techniques. 
 
A. Proactive Defence 
Proactive defence is underpinned by the “security by 
design” principle practiced in the software industry [6],[7]. 
Integration of common security practices, public key 
encryption and hash-based message authentication fall 
under this category [4],[9]. 
B. Active Defence 
Active defence mitigates threats as they occur. For 
instance, continuous monitoring can be applied to detect 
intrusions and preserve the security hygiene of the vehicle 
and take adequate remediation actions [10]; in this sense, 
real-time monitoring enables the identification and isolation 
of faulty applications in safety-critical systems [11]. 
Detection approaches for the in-vehicle network can be 
categorised as i) Signature-Based Detection, ii) Anomaly-
Based Detection and iii) Hybrid Approach [12]-[15]:  
 Signature-Based Detection: These approaches use 
information about attacks (signatures) as a pattern 
characterizing known threats, comparing signatures 
against observed events to identify possible attacks.  
 Anomaly-Based Detection: These approaches are based 
on continuous monitoring of system activities, checking 
against a reference model (e.g., profile of the system). 
An alarm is raised if deviation from the reference 
model is observed. Various mechanisms can be applied 
to derive the reference model, such as machine learning 
[16],[17], frequency-based [18]-[20], and statistical-
based methods [21],[22]. 
 Hybrid Approach: This family of approach comprises 
several intrusion detection techniques (e.g., signature- 
and anomaly-based detection). 
In addition to in-vehicle intrusion detection, several 
approaches explore detection of side channel attacks for the 
automotive domain - at the physical layer [23], using cache-
based [24] or interface-based approaches [25],[26]. 
C. Passive Defence 
Passive defence mainly focuses on detecting, responding 
to, and recovering from an attack once it has occurred. This 
type of defence is notably suitable to prevent malwares and 
code injection and modification threats. Therefore, passive 
defences are not suitable for safety-critical systems, like 
autonomous vehicles, as these approaches do not facilitate 
detection and mitigation of adversaries in real-time 
[8],Error! Reference source not found.. 
It should be noted that proactive defence and passive 
defence are not suitable to handle adaptive security 
requirements, very common in the cyber and the automotive 
domains. Proactive defence recommends designing control 
features to meet the security objectives at system design 
time and embedding such features in the system. However, 
this approach is unable to cover new types of threats once 
the system has been developed. On the other hand, passive 
defences alone are not suitable for safety-critical systems, 
such as autonomous vehicles, as these approaches detect the 
attack once it has occurred. Also the active defence 
techniques approaches found in the literature apply 
continuous monitoring to detect anomalies, but did not 
consider their application to secure execution environments 
for ECUs. As described in the next sections, our approach 
aims to address these limitations. 
III. IN-VEHICLE ISOLATION AND RESILIENCE 
We adopt the active defence approach to improve in-
vehicle resilience: security properties related to the 
communication among ECUs will be continuously 
monitored in order to detect security threats, and actions 
will be taken to mitigate the impact of and gracefully 
recover from the detected threat. Recovery in our context 
consists of rolling back (or forward) to a stable state to 




Figure 1. Reference Architecture of Isolation and Resilience Framework 
 
Figure 1 shows the proposed reference architecture for 
threat detection and mitigation in the in-vehicle network. 
ECUs are grouped into different domains according to 
similarity of functionalities. All ECUs in a domain are 
connected to the same communication bus and activities of 
each ECU in a domain are controlled by one domain 
controller. Domain controllers are connected through a 
common gateway in order to enable communication among 
the ECUs belong to different domains [4],[9]. The major 
components of the architecture are: 
A. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) 
Trusted Execution Environments enable to specify 
isolated execution environment in the main processor 
[28],[29]. The TEE provides security features such as 
isolated execution, integrity of applications executing in the 
TEE, and confidentiality of application assets. Several 
hardware vendors provide embedded technologies that can 
be used to support TEE implementations, including AMD 
PSP [30], ARM TrustZone [31], EVITA Hardware Security 
Modules (HSM) [32] and Intel SGX Software Guard 
Extensions [33].  We aim to explore if TEEs could be 
applied as secure execution environment for ECUs, thereby 
ensuring secure/isolated communication from ECU to ECU. 
B. Side Channel Attack Monitor 
While TEEs aim to provide secured execution 
environments, they are vulnerable to side-channel attacks 
[34],[35]. This component focuses on runtime detection of 
the variants of side-channel attacks (e.g., SGX interface-
based attacks) that are relevant in a vehicular context. 
 
C. Monitoring and Certification Manager 
The responsibility of this component is to perform real-
time monitoring of security properties related to components 
(e.g., ECUs) in the in-vehicle network to detect security 
threats. This component applies the hybrid approach 
(including frequency-based, statistical-based, and deep 
packet inspection approaches) to detect spoofing and replay 
attacks. Based on the validity of the security properties, this 
component also maintains the certificates (detailed in 
Section IV.B) that certify the valid state of the ECUs. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
We adopt the AUTOSAR open standard for automotive 
software architecture and framework to implement the 
architecture presented in Section III. The AUTOSAR 
consortium was formed by major automotive OEMs like 
BMW, Ford, Daimler and Chrysler to standardize the 
automotive software architecture and framework, thereby 
facilitating scalability, reusability and interoperability across 
the products lines from different OEMs [36]. The use of 
AUTOSAR in the implementation would therefore 
inherently enable the prototype to have the same benefits. 
Next, we briefly introduce AUTOSAR, and then discuss 
the mapping between our framework and AUTOSAR. In 
AUTOSAR, the ECU software is abstracted in a layered 
architecture, built on top of the underlying micro-controller 
hardware [37]. As shown in Figure 2, this architecture is 
composed of three layers, namely Basic Software (BSW), 
Runtime Environment (RTE), and Application Layer. 
 
 
 Figure 2. Overview of AUTOSAR components [37] 
 
Basic Software Layer (BSW) is the bottom layer of the 
architecture and provides core system functionalities. This 
layer has 3 sub-layers. First, the Micro-controller 
Abstraction Layer (MCAL) contains internal driver modules 
that access the underlying micro-controller and internal 
peripherals directly. Second, the ECU Abstraction Layer 
(ECUAL) interfaces the drivers of the MCAL and offers an 
API for accessing the peripherals and external devices, thus 
making higher software layers independent of the hardware 
layout. And third, the Services Layer (SL) provides top-
level services (e.g., operating system functionality, 
communication services, management services, memory 
services, etc.) to application software components. 
The Run-Time Environment (RTE) layer provides 
communication services to the application software, acting 
as a bridge between the application and the BSW layer. 
The Application Layer mainly consists of software 
components (SWC) interconnected to other SWCs and 
BSW modules. This layer is component-based, which 
enhances SWC scalability and re-usability. 
    Figure 3 shows the mapping of the major components of 
our framework to the AUTOSAR architecture. We propose 
to add an ECU that takes the role of monitoring existing 
ECUs in the system, and to isolate ECUs.  
The left side (yellow box) of the Figure 3 shows the 
deployment of virtual ECUs within the TEE, following the 
AUTOSAR architecture.  The right side of the Figure 3  
shows the Domain Controller, Monitoring & Certification 
Manager and Side Channel Attack Monitor components of 
the framework developed as SWCs in the AUTOSAR 
application layer, i.e., these software components will reside 
within a trusted virtual ECU and will collect the data 
transmitted among the virtual ECUs of the in-vehicle 
network. Such data will be used for monitoring the security 
properties related to different ECUs. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mapping the framework to AUTOSAR 
     
A. Monitoring 
As shown in Figure 3, the Monitoring and Certification 
Manager and the Side Channel Attack Monitor will collect 
the data transmitted among the virtual ECUs of the in-
vehicle network. A sub-component, namely DataCollector, 
will be deployed for transforming the data from a legacy 
format (e.g., CAN bus, being the most widely used protocol 
in the automotive industry [38]) to a format that used for 
monitoring. 
This design may help to support multiple 
communication standards in the framework (e.g., 
Automotive Ethernet) by implementing a dedicated 
DataCollector (e.g., converting in-vehicle data from 
Automotive Ethernet to network monitoring format). Using 
multiple monitoring ECUs (e.g., for each sets of Domain 
Controllers) may help addressing safety constraints to avoid 
single points of failure. 
B. Certificate Model 
The Monitoring & Certification Manager and Side 
Channel Attack Monitor perform real-time monitoring of 
security properties related to ECUs to detect security threats 
and produce a certificate for the in-vehicle network. 
Monitoring is driven by security properties expressed as 
condition-action rules verified by a rule engine (e.g., CLIPS 
[39]) against runtime facts (i.e., runtime data). Monitoring 
results are accumulated to produce a certificate that certifies 
the state of the monitored components (e.g., ECUs). 
The certificate structure includes the following elements: 
1) CertificateID: represents the unique identifier of a 
generated certificate during the monitoring process. 
 
2) MonitoringResultAggregator: aggregates monitoring 
results produced by monitoring different components (e.g., 
ECUs, CAN bus etc.) of the in-vehicle network. This 
element contains the following sub-elements: 
 AggregationTime: denotes the time of aggregation.  
 Duration: specifies the timespan between   
monitoring results considered for aggregation.  
 ToMLis: specifies a list of TargetOfMonitoring 
considered for the aggregation operation. 
 AggregationRule: defines how monitoring results 
should be aggregated, e.g., for results with 
numerical values by applying statistical methods.  
 AggregationResult: stores the aggregation result. 
 
3) TargetOfMonitoring (ToM): a component (e.g., ECU, 
CAN bus, etc.) monitored to identify security threats 
associated with it.  
The ToM has the following sub-elements 
 ToMType: the type of component to be monitored. 
 ToMID: a unique identifier of the component in the 
in-vehicle network. 
 MonitoringRule: the security property related to this 
component to be monitored. 
 MonitoringEvidenceAggregator: contains the 
aggregation of results by monitoring the 
MonitoringRule related to this component.  
 
The MonitoringEvidence Aggregator contains the 
following sub-elements: 
 AggregationTime; denotes the time of aggregation. 
 Duration: specifies the time span between in-
vehicle network data considered for monitoring.  
 AggregationRule:  defines how monitoring results 
should be aggregated, e.g., for results with 
numerical values by applying statistical methods.  
 AggregationResult:  stores the aggregation result. 
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
This position paper provided an overview of defence 
strategies to mitigate common threats to in-vehicle 
networks. We proposed an architecture and framework to 
enhance in-vehicle isolation and resilience focusing on 
spoofing, replay and side-channel attacks. The framework 
follows an active defence strategy to detect and react to 
intrusions on the in-vehicle network and to recover from 
attacks. This recovery may be rolling back to a stable state 
to overcome an intrusion (e.g., in [27]), or to estimate the 
stable state by applying different techniques (e.g., in [5]). 
This framework may also be used to detect anomaly or 
misbehavior, which are not necessarily resulting from 
cyberattacks but simply from system faults and to limit their 
propagation in such a system of systems (e.g., in [40]). 
Next steps are to implement the framework, and to evaluate 
its isolation and resilience benefits in a simple setting, first 
using simulations, before a possible testbed implementation. 
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